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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As a child, Perry Hopkins wanted to be president.
1
  After a court 
convicted him of a non-violent drug felony, he lost more than his ability to 
be president; he lost the ability to even cast a vote in a presidential 
election.
2
  Hopkins vividly remembers the night when Barack Obama, a 
fellow African-American man, became the first African-American 
president, and how he celebrated the win with his neighbors, family, and 
friends in the streets.
3
  The elation quickly subsided when someone looked 
to him and said, “You got a record, you couldn’t vote.  You can’t claim 
this.  You ain’t got nothing to do with this.”
4
 
While Perry Hopkins eventually gained back his right to vote, other ex-
felons have not been so fortunate.
5
  Desmond Meade, who has lived in 
Florida his entire life, has not been able to cast a vote since his release from 
prison for a felony conviction.
6
  Despite serving his time, Meade could not 
even vote for his own wife because of the felony conviction he received 
                                                          
 1.  See Rachel Martin, Debate Over Restoring Voting Rights to Ex-Felons, DIANE 
REHM SHOW (May 12, 2016, 11:00 AM), http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2016-05-
12/felony-disenfranchisement (chronicling Hopkins’ life before he went to prison). 
 2.  See Ian Simpson, U.S. States Giving More Ex-felons Voting Rights Back, 
REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2016, 2:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-
felons-idUSKCN0WO27H (detailing how a criminal background can impact a citizen’s 
future in more ways than one). 
 3.  See Martin, supra note 1 (recounting Hopkins’ emotions surrounding the 
election night in 2008). 
 4.  See id. (emphasizing the shame and stigma stemming from Hopkins’ felony 
conviction).  
 5.  See Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Maryland, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-
restoration-efforts-maryland (explaining Maryland’s recent law restoring voting rights 
to felons who are completing probation or parole).  
 6.  See Alice Miranda Ollstein, More Than 1.5 Million Florida Voters Will Be 
Missing From Tuesday’s Primary, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://thinkprogress.org/more-than-1-5-million-florida-voters-will-be-missing-from-
tuesdays-primary-ec745315b6c8#.sxlvdkmnh (describing Meade’s personal life and 
connection to politics that have influenced his fight for felon voting rights). 
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more than ten years ago.
7
 
Perry Hopkins and Desmond Meade are two of nearly 6.1 million ex-
felons that face nearly insurmountable barriers when trying to gain back 
their right to vote.
8
  Six states currently disenfranchise more than seven 
percent of its adult population.
9
 
Although only four states completely disenfranchise felons, a mass 
majority of states still place some restriction on felons ability to vote.
10
  
Only two states, Maine and Vermont, allow ex-felons to vote while they 
are still in prison.
11
  As of 2016, fourteen states allowed felons to vote after 
being released from prison, four states permitted felons to vote after being 
released from prison and completing parole, eighteen allowed felons to 
vote after being released from prison, completing parole, and completing 
probation, while twelve states required a combination of completing prison 




This Comment argues that restrictive felony disenfranchisement laws 
violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
13
  Part II 
describes the current felon voting rights laws in Florida, Tennessee, and 
Pennsylvania.
14
  Part II also describes past attempts to challenge felon 
disenfranchisement laws in the United States Supreme Court, as well as in 
State courts.
15
  Part III compares the felon disenfranchisement laws in 
                                                          
 7.  See id. (chronicling how Meade lost his voting rights and was unable to vote 
for his wife, who was the youngest African-American woman in Florida to become a 
state legislator). 
 8.  See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL 
ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016 at 3 (The Sent’g Project 2016) 
(highlighting the number of felons currently disenfranchised in the United States).   
 9.  See id. (referring to Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, and 
Virginia).  
 10.  See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT 1 (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Felony-Disenfranchisement-Laws-in-the-US.pdf (discussing 
challenges to felon disenfranchisement laws). 
 11.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (describing how Maine and Vermont 
permit all citizens to vote, despite a criminal conviction).   
 12.  See Simpson, supra note 2 (highlighting the most lenient states with respect to 
felon voting rights laws). 
 13.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (establishing that it is unconstitutional to inflict 
cruel and unusual punishments). 
 14.  See infra Part II (comparing the felon voting rights laws of Pennsylvania to 
both Florida and Tennessee). 
 15.  See infra Part II (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, and the Eighth Amendment).  
3
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Pennsylvania to the restrictive laws enacted in Florida and Tennessee, 
highlighting the clear oppressive nature of the laws.
16
  Part III further 
asserts that the more restrictive laws of Florida and Tennessee constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
17
  Part IV 
recommends that these restrictive laws encouraging felony 
disenfranchisement be eliminated.
18
  Part V concludes by reiterating that 
the laws in Florida and Tennessee fully deprive ex-felons of the right to 




II.  BACKGROUND 
A. State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws 
1.  Florida 
Florida alone accounts for nearly half of the post-sentence felons 
disenfranchised nationally, with nearly 1.5 million disenfranchised in the 
state.
20
  Florida’s implementation of laws that prevent felons from voting 
goes back to its 1838 Constitution.
21
 
The Florida Constitution outright excludes any felon or mentally 
incompetent person from voting until his or her rights are restored.
22
  
Florida law provides that a governor, with the approval of two members of 
the Cabinet, may grant either full or conditional pardons to felons, 
commute their punishment, or restore their civil rights.
23
  Additionally, any 
                                                          
 16.  See infra Part III (demonstrating the differences in how felons are treated 
state-to-state and the clear hardship felons face after completing their sentences and 
serving their time). 
 17.  See infra Part III (suggesting that where challenges to the First Amendment, 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Voting Rights Act of 1965 fail, the Eighth Amendment 
should succeed). 
 18.  See infra Part IV (voicing the unfairness of restrictive felon 
disenfranchisement laws and recommending that states adopt Pennsylvania’s felon 
voting rights laws).  
 19.  See infra Part V (concluding that the Eighth Amendment should be an avenue 
to repealing felon disenfranchisement laws). 
 20.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3, 13 (highlighting that, of the 1.5 million 
felons disenfranchised in Florida, only 271,982 restorations have been given from 
1990-2015).   
 21.  See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(discussing the trend of felon disenfranchisement laws in Florida and its long history).   
 22.  See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (placing limitations on certain people deemed 
ineligible to vote in Florida). 
 23.  See FLA. STAT. § 940.01 (2003) (explaining the options available to a governor 
when presented with an individual felon).  
4
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A Floridian felon’s right to vote is not lost forever, as he may seek 
clemency to restore his rights.
25
  The Florida Constitution vests clemency 
power in the Governor.
26
  A governor has the discretion to restore the right 
to vote to some felons, while denying that right to others.
27
  Currently, all 
convicted criminals, regardless of the felony committed, must wait five to 
seven years after completing their sentence before they may begin the 




2.  Tennessee 
Much like Florida, Tennessee currently disenfranchises 421,227 felons.
29
  
In Tennessee, felons that commit certain felonies are completely 
disenfranchised, whereas others not convicted of other felonies may apply 
to the Board of Probate and Parole for restoration.
30
  The Tennessee 
Constitution requires that elections be free and equal, and voting rights not 
be denied unless a person commits an “infamous crime.”
31
  If not convicted 
of an infamous crime, a felon in Tennessee may have full rights of 
citizenship restored upon: (1) receiving a pardon that does not contain a 
                                                          
 24.  See FLA. STAT. § 940.05 (2014) (explaining that restoration will be granted 
only by receiving a pardon, serving the maximum sentence imposed, or being granted 
release by the Florida Commission). 
 25.  See Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12–cv–609–FtM–38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (discussing Florida’s clemency rules, which previously 
restored voting rights automatically to individuals convicted of non-violent crimes that 
served their sentence, but now requires felons to wait five to seven years after 
completion of their sentence to apply for restoration).  
 26.  See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a) (providing that the clemency process is solely 
an executive branch function).  
 27.  See Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (ruling that 
a man who was refused the right to register, solely because he was a convicted felon, 
was constitutional). 
 28.  See Verity, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 (explaining the expansion of the 
clemency rules put into place under Governor Scott). 
 29.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13, 15 (restoring only 11,581 out of 
421,227 ex-felons voting rights during 1990-2015).   
 30.  See O’Neal v. Goins, No. M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at 
*1, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2016) (dismissing the complaint by an ex-felon who 
argued that allowing discretional approval by the court for restoration of voting rights 
was unconstitutional).   
 31.  See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (allowing felonies of murder, rape, treason, or 
voter fraud to deny a felon of civil rights but allowing those not convicted of those 
crimes to restore voting rights through court order or certificate of restoration).  
5
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position on suffrage; (2) completion of a sentence imposed for the 




Tennessee has perhaps the most perplexing felony disenfranchisement 
laws in the United States.
33
  Felon disenfranchisement laws in Tennessee 
require that those convicted before 1986 petition to the court while 
prosecutors are given an opportunity to object; those convicted after 1996 
are subject to the same rules except those convicted of infamous crimes; 
and those convicted between 1986 and 1996 may petition for 
administrative restoration of rights, without a potentially adversarial 
hearing.
34
  People convicted after 1996 are subject to the same rules, except 
that those convicted of infamous crimes in Tennessee are permanently 
disenfranchised.
35
 Additionally, Tennessee also requires that an ex-felon 




3.  Pennsylvania 
As of 2016, Pennsylvania disenfranchises 52,974 felons.
37
  However, 
Pennsylvania is one of fourteen states that only disenfranchises felons 
during their prison sentences.
38
  The Pennsylvania Constitution provides 




Moreover, the Pennsylvania Constitution stresses that no power, civil or 
                                                          
 32.  See id. (listing the circumstances in which a person who has not committed an 
infamous crime may regain their full rights). 
 33.  See Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Tennessee, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUSTICE (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-
restoration-efforts-tennessee (discussing the state’s felon voting laws). 
 34.  See id. (highlighting the complicated process for felons to regain their voting 
rights in Tennessee).  
 35.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-105(c)(2)(B) (2013) (defining infamous crimes 
as murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud). 
 36.  See id. § 40-29-202(b)(1)-(2) (2013); Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753 
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that requiring a felon to pay $40,000 restitution for wire fraud 
and more than $1,000 in child support prior to restoration is constitutional).  
 37.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (highlighting that those 52,974 felons 
make up 0.52 percent of the adult population).   
 38.  See id. (demonstrating that Pennsylvania is one of the more lenient states with 
respect to felon disenfranchisement).   
 39.  See PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (stressing that certain rights are so fundamental that 
all people should equally receive them, including enjoying and defending life and 
liberty). 
6
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military, should interfere or prevent the exercise of the right of suffrage.
40
  
However, those who meet the age and residency requirements are allowed 
to vote unless the General Assembly enacts laws, within its powers, that 
regulate the registration of electors.
41
 
Pennsylvania election code does not explicitly disenfranchise 
incarcerated prisoners.
42
  However, sections 102(w) and 1301 define a 
qualified absentee elector and provide that the definition shall exclude 
“persons confined in a penal institution.”
43
  Despite the exclusion of 
incarcerated prisoners, this provision does not violate the Constitution.
44
  
Federal courts determined that the Code could not possibly violate the 
Constitution by denying incarcerated felons the right to vote while 
permitting those not incarcerated to do so.
45
  Because lawful incarceration 
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and 
rights, requiring some form of felon disenfranchisement is constitutional.
46
  
It is not the function of the court to superintend the treatment and discipline 




Although Pennsylvania now does not disenfranchise felons who have 
completed their sentences, the state was not always so progressive.
48
  The 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court (one of the two statewide intermediate 
appellate courts in Pennsylvania) found that no rational basis existed to 
                                                          
 40.  See PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (reiterating the importance of allowing 
Pennsylvania’s citizens their right to vote). 
 41.  See PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (expressing that, while voting is a fundamental 
right in Pennsylvania, federal law dictates that states can only regulate certain aspects 
of the process). 
 42.  See Martin v. Haggerty, 548 A.2d 371, 373-74 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) 
(discussing the lack of felon disenfranchisement laws in Pennsylvania).  
 43.  See 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (effectively 
disqualifying only incarcerated felons from voting).   
 44.  See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding Pennsylvania 
provisions do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 45.  See id. (upholding the Pennsylvania provision because it only disenfranchised 
a small portion of felons and granted rights to non-incarcerated felons in general).  
 46.  See id. at 27-28 (holding that it was constitutional to deny incarcerated felons 
the right to vote while simultaneously allowing non-incarcerated felons to vote). 
 47.  See Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (citing Hoge 
v. Maroney, 211 F. Supp. 197, 198 (W.D. Pa. 1962)) (arguing that a felon cannot vote 
while incarcerated because only when fundamental, humane, and necessary rights are 
breached will constitutional protections become involved). 
 48.  See Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 445 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) 
(discussing the Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act which denies a felon the right to 
vote unless he been out of prison for over five years).  
7
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preclude the registration of those incarcerated within the last five years 




B.  Attempts to Provide Voting Rights to Felons in the United States 
1.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
Felon disenfranchisement laws challenged under the Fourteenth 
Amendment have largely failed.
50
  Generally, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, political suffrage is not considered an absolute or natural 
right.
51
  Rather, state constitutions and statutes confer the right of political 
suffrage, making that right subject to exclusive regulation by the state.
52
 
Although courts generally deem the right to vote fundamental, the courts 
have not found it fundamental when evaluating felon disenfranchisement 
laws.
53
  The United States Supreme Court looked to the prevalence of felon 
disenfranchisement laws during the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to justify the upholding of felon disenfranchisement laws.
54
  The 
prevalence of felon disenfranchisement laws at the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment led the Court to find that the crafters clearly did 
not think these types of laws violated due process.
55
 
2.  Voting Rights Act (Act) of 1965 
Courts have also examined the constitutionality of felon 
disenfranchisement laws under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
56
  Although 
                                                          
 49.  See id. at 451 (holding the Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act section at issue 
unconstitutional). 
 50.  See Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State 
Criminal Disenfranchisement Provisions, 10 A.L.R. 6th 31 §§ 8-10 (2006) (listing the 
challenges to the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 51.  See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974) (rationalizing that state 
requirements on age and residence show that a previous criminal record can also be 
taken into consideration); see also State ex. rel. Olson v. Langer, 256 N.W. 377, 385 
(N.D. 1934) (explaining that voting rights are restricted for minors, therefore, states can 
restrict voting rights for felons, too). 
 52.  See Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (giving states 
the power to enact felon disenfranchisement laws). 
 53.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560, 561-62 (1964) (explaining that the 
right of suffrage is a fundamental right). 
 54.  See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 48-49 (recognizing that, after the Civil War, every 
confederate state had to submit a state constitution—many of which were approved 
with felon disenfranchisement laws).  
 55.  See id. (stressing the importance of the crafter’s intent in the creation of laws). 
 56.  See Miller, supra note 50, at §§ 14-15 (listing the challenges under the Voting 
8
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felon disenfranchisement laws generally do not violate the Act, courts have 
not determined whether the Act could be an avenue for finding specific 
felon disenfranchisement laws unconstitutional.
57
  The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that the Act’s purpose was to rid any 
disparate racial impact of facially neutral voting requirements.
58
  In line 
with this ruling, the Ninth Circuit further found that if felon 
disenfranchisement laws were enacted to discriminate on the basis of race, 
then that may violate the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
59
 
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the potential 
success of future felon disenfranchisement challenges under the Act and 
provides that it could afford disenfranchised felons the means to seek 
redress in limited circumstances.
60
  Despite the Supreme Court’s glimpse of 
hope for challenging these types of laws under the Act, both the Second 




3.  Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Eighth Amendment 
Judges and academics have debated the proper interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause for some 
time.
62
  If the courts interpret the Eighth Amendment by the standards at 
the time of ratification, it may only refer to the most egregious of 
                                                          
Rights Act of 1965 that deal with disparate, discriminatory effects of felon 
disenfranchisement laws). 
 57.  See id. (explaining that the Voting Rights Act has not been completely 
eliminated as a route to challenge felon disenfranchisement when the laws discriminate 
based on race). 
 58.  See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-33 (1985) (holding that if any 
voting qualifications denied citizens the right to vote based on race, they would be 
considered unconstitutional). 
 59.  See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that a claim that felony disenfranchisement provisions violate the Act is cognizable 
under certain circumstances, such as racial bias, where Alabama discriminated against 
African-Africans when disenfranchising felons).   
 60.  See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 (holding that although Richardson v. Ramirez, 
418 U.S. 24, 49 (1974) allows states to deprive felons the right to vote, 52 U.S.C. § 
10301 (2016) allows felons to challenge disenfranchisement laws if discrimination 
occurs). 
 61.  See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the Act generally does not prohibit felon disenfranchisement laws); 
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding the felon 
disenfranchisement statute because finding it unconstitutional would alter the balance 
between the states and the Federal Government).   
 62.  See Miller, supra note 50, at § 7 (stressing the complexity of the Eighth 
Amendment). 
9
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punishments.
63
  Alternatively, if courts interpret the Eighth Amendment 




Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has extended 
the Eighth Amendment to cover less traditional cruel and unusual 
punishments three times.
65
  The first case adjudging a punishment to be 
cruel and unusual punishment occurred when a man was sentenced to 
fifteen years imprisonment for falsifying a public and official document.
66
  




The second case adjudicating a punishment to be within the confines of 
cruel and unusual punishment occurred when a United States Army private 
was convicted of desertion, and sentenced to three years hard labor, loss of 
all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge.
68
  Trop later applied 
for a passport but was denied under Section 401(g) of the amended 1940 
Nationality Act.
69
  The Court extended the Eighth Amendment, finding the 
punishment to be cruel and unusual.
70
 
The third case declaring a punishment falls under the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause involved a state statute making addiction of narcotics a 
criminal offense.
71
  The Court determined that laws imprisoning people 
afflicted with narcotic addictions constituted cruel and unusual 
                                                          
 63.  See id. (discussing the history of the Eighth Amendment). 
 64.  See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (accepting a modern 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that would allow a court to see what actions 
are considered cruel and unusual based on what society at that point in time finds cruel 
and unusual). 
 65.  See Miller, supra note 50, at § 7 (explaining the very narrow range of Eighth 
Amendment application that generally focus on death penalty procedures or excessive 
physical punishment).  
 66.  See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 359 (1910) (holding that 
punishments must be proportionate to the crime).  
 67.  See id. at 373-74 (explaining that a principle, to be vital, must be capable of 
wider application).  
 68.  See Trop, 356 U.S. at 87-88 (detailing how Trop willingly surrendered to an 
officer after deserting the army for less than a day).  
 69.  See id. (explaining that Trop lost his citizenship under the 1940 Nationality 
Act due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion). 
 70.  See id. at 101 (expanding cruel and unusual punishment to include expatriation 
because his crime should not cause him to lose his citizenship). 
 71.  See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661-62 (1962) (explaining that 
Robinson was arrested and charged after an officer saw scar tissue and discoloration on 
his arms, which are consistent with signs of addiction to narcotics).  
10
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punishment.
72
  The Court provided that if addiction was criminal, then “to 
be mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease” also 
had the potential to be criminalized.
73
 
Felon disenfranchisement does not neatly fit into any of the previously 
mentioned cases where the Court identified cruel and unusual 
punishment.
74
  Generally, felon disenfranchisement matches closest with 
Trop v. Dulles and the punishment of expatriation.
75
  However, depriving 
felons of voting rights is often not viewed as a punishment, but rather a 
non-penal exercise of the state’s power to regulate the franchise.
76
  The 
legislature and the states, alternatively, find that evidence would exist if the 
framers considered disenfranchisement laws punishment.
77
  Because a 
majority of the states exclude felons from voting, courts refuse to consider 
these statutes cruel and unusual punishment.
78
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. A Comparison of Pennsylvania to Florida and Tennessee’s Laws 
Demonstrates That the Latter States Unfairly Disenfranchise Ex-Felon 
Voters 
Both Florida and Tennessee, unlike Pennsylvania, place nearly 
insurmountable barriers on a felon who is trying to gain back his right to 
vote.
79
  While Florida and Tennessee boast more than two million 
                                                          
 72.  See id. at 666 (finding that statutes violate cruel and unusual punishment when 
they criminalize illnesses which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily).  
 73.  See id. (cautioning about the slippery slope that would occur if the addiction 
criminalization statute were upheld).  
 74.  See Miller, supra note 50, at § 7 (discussing the struggle of arguing the 
unconstitutionality of felon disenfranchisement laws under the Eighth Amendment). 
 75.  But see, e.g. Thiess v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 387 F. Supp. 1038, 
1043 (D. Md. 1974) (allowing for the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of 
infamous crimes).  
 76.  See Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(holding the felon disenfranchisement laws are non-violative of the Eighth Amendment 
as they do not incur a harm egregious enough to be considered cruel and unusual).  
 77.  See id. (stressing the popularity of felon disenfranchisement laws at the 
ratification of the Bill of Rights). 
 78.  See El-Amin v. McDonnell, No. 3:12-cv-005380-JAG, 2013 WL 1193357, at 
*1, *6-7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2013) (finding widespread enactment of laws proves that 
they are not cruel and unusual punishment). 
 79.  Compare 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (restricting 
incarcerated felons in Pennsylvania from voting), with FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 
(allowing voting rights to be restored discretionally by the Governor), and TENN. 
CONST. art. I, § 5 (allowing restoration through court ordered approval).  
11
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disenfranchised voters combined, Pennsylvania disenfranchises a modest 
amount of less than fifty-three thousand.
80
  This astronomically unequal 
amount of disenfranchised voters is not shocking when looking at the laws 
in place in each of these states.
81
  Pennsylvania’s state Constitution 
mentions nothing about felon voting prohibitions, whereas both Florida and 




Pennsylvania, Florida, and Tennessee all implement some voting 
restriction on felons at various points in a felon’s journey through the 
conviction, sentencing, parole, and rehabilitative process.
83
  However, 
unlike Florida and Tennessee, Pennsylvania’s state Constitution and laws 
encourage people to register and exercise their right to vote.
84
  The 
Pennsylvania Constitution highlights the importance of voting in order to 
keep a free, democratic society.
85
  It articulates that only the state itself may 
regulate laws that prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.
86
  
Although Pennsylvania recognizes that it retains the right to create laws 
that disenfranchise voters like felons, Pennsylvania has generally chosen 
not to enact more restrictive laws.
87
 
                                                          
 80.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (demonstrating Florida and Tennessee 
disenfranchise more than eight percent of population, while Pennsylvania 
disenfranchises only 0.52 percent).   
 81.  Compare 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (indicating 
that only incarcerated felons are restricted from voting in Pennsylvania), with Fla. 
Const. art. VI, § 4 (restricting voting rights for convicted felons unless they were 
restored by a governor), and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (requiring discretionally given 
court ordered approval of voting rights). 
 82.  Compare PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (mentioning only that Pennsylvania’s 
General Assembly maintains the right to create other voting related laws, but does not 
specify that they must be related to felon disenfranchisement), with FLA. CONST. art. 
VI, § 4 (stating that no person convicted of a felony is capable of voting without direct 
restoration from the Governor), and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (mentioning directly that 
people convicted of certain felonies are immediately disenfranchised). 
 83.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (providing a current summary of state 
felon disenfranchisement restrictions).   
 84.  See PA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (providing that “all men are born equally free and 
independent . . . .”). 
 85.  See PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (reiterating the importance of the right to vote by 
placing few limitations on voters). 
 86.  See PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (mentioning how states can enact laws denying the 
right to vote). 
 87.  Compare Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 445-46 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2000) (rejecting a law that placed more restrictions on felon voting rights), with Verity 
v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) 
(opting not to consider whether a waiting period of five to seven years after completing 
sentencing is unconstitutional). 
12
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In fact, in Pennsylvania’s state Constitution, felon disenfranchisement is 
not referenced at all; the only time felon disenfranchisement is mentioned 
is in the Pennsylvania Election Code’s definition of a “qualified absentee 
voter.”
88
  Even when a person has challenged a felon disenfranchisement 
law in Pennsylvania, the courts have denied the claims as being 
unconstitutional because clearly the disenfranchisement laws were so 
limited a court could not consider them excessive.
89
  Pennsylvania’s lenient 
felon disenfranchisement laws allow an ex-felon to regain his voting rights 
the moment he completes his sentence, unlike Florida and Tennessee.
90
 
The only way Pennsylvania could implement more lenient felon 
disenfranchisement laws would be to have no restrictions whatsoever on a 
felon’s voting rights during incarceration.
91
  Since its first ratification in 
1776, the Pennsylvania Constitution has allowed the state to create 
disenfranchisement laws so long as it resides within the framework of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.
92
  The United States Supreme Court has argued 
that because felon disenfranchisement laws have existed throughout United 
States’ history, the founders must have considered these laws constitutional 
and within a state’s power to regulate.
93
  However, the Court has ignored 
that other states, like Pennsylvania, were choosing to implement these laws 
in a less restrictive manner.
94
 
While the law requires some rights to be given during a prison sentence, 
                                                          
 88.  Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (stating that any felon or mentally 
incompetent person can be prevented from voting until his or her rights have been 
restored by a governor or clemency board), with Martin v. Haggerty, 548 A.2d 371, 
373 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (explaining that only the definition of “qualified absentee 
elector” in the Pennsylvania Election Code does not include persons confined to a 
penal institution or mental institution). 
 89.  See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (denying an incarcerated 
felon voting rights while allowing an un-incarcerated felon to vote is not 
unconstitutional). 
 90.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (recognizing that twelve states restrict a 
felon’s voting rights through parole, probation, and post-sentence while fourteen states 
restrict a felon’s voting rights only during the period of incarceration).   
 91.  See id. (highlighting that, if Pennsylvania’s laws were any more lenient they 
would have no restriction whatsoever, like Maine and Vermont). 
 92.  See PA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (explaining that the Pennsylvania Constitution 
already dictates that age and residency are factors to be considered in voting laws, so 
the General Assembly could also craft laws that disenfranchise others, like felons). 
 93.  See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48-49 (1974) (examining felon 
voting rights at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and evaluating the Framer’s 
intent when crafting the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 94.  See Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 445-46 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) 
(rejecting the five year waiting period law that placed more restrictions on felon voting 
rights). 
13
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a mass majority of the states recognize that voting rights do not have to be 
provided during a prison sentence.
95
  However, states like Tennessee and 
Florida choose to continue to suppress a felon’s right to vote long after he 
or she has been released.
96
  Unlike Florida and Tennessee, Pennsylvania 
also has chosen to provide this previously restricted right back to an ex-
felon at the first opportunity available.
97
  After all, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that the right to vote freely is the essence of a 
democratic society and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of a 
representative government.
98
  Unlike Tennessee and Florida, Pennsylvania 
recognizes that the denial of voting rights to felons should only be used in 
the most limited of circumstances.
99
 
Despite recognizing that some suppression of voting rights for felons is 
constitutional, Pennsylvania courts have been quick to revoke felon 
disenfranchisement laws that place unnecessary burdens on felons, which is 
significantly different than other states.
100
  When faced with the 
Pennsylvania Voting Rights Act that required a waiting period for ex-
felons to regain their rights back, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth court 
                                                          
 95.  See Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (explaining 
that incarcerated felons have rights like the right to unlimited access to the courts but 
not the right to vote); see also UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4. 
 96.  See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (requiring petitions through the courts for 
restoration); see also FLA. STAT. § 940.05 (2014) (requiring a pardon, service of the 
maximum sentence imposed, or release by Florida’s Commission before petitioning for 
restoration). 
 97.  Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (excluding any felon or mentally 
incompetent person from voting until his or her rights have been restored by a governor 
or clemency board), and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (allowing felons not convicted of 
infamous crimes to restore voting rights through court order or certificate of 
restoration), with Ray, 263 F. Supp. at 631 (restoring voting rights once released from 
incarceration).  
 98.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (holding that the right of 
suffrage is a fundamental right). 
 99.  Compare Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (allowing a 
disenfranchisement provision because it only disenfranchised a small portion of 
felons), with Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring 
payment of debts before being allowed to restore voting rights), and Verity v. Scott, 
No. 2:12–cv–609–FtM–38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) 
(discussing a five to seven year waiting period after completion of sentencing, parole, 
or probation).   
 100.  Compare Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 
2005) (declaring felon disenfranchisement constitutional because this power is given to 
state governments), and Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 753 (requiring that felons who want to 
regain voting rights to pay restitution), with Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 
451-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (rejecting a law that places waiting periods on felons).   
14
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chose to overrule it.
101
  The court reiterated that it made no sense to install a 
waiting period on some but not all felons.
102
  Pennsylvania’s felon 
disenfranchisement laws are ideal, as Pennsylvania recognizes the 
importance of voting but also acknowledges that under certain 
circumstances, the right to vote should be denied.
103
 
Pennsylvania’s laws serve as a stark contrast when compared against 
Florida and Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement laws.
104
  Florida boasts 
the most disenfranchised group of voters in America with nearly 1.5 
million disenfranchised felons.
105
  Tennessee only disenfranchises 421,277 
ex-felons; however, this still accounts for over eight percent of its adult 
population.
106
  Combined, both Florida and Tennessee disenfranchise 
nearly two million ex-felons.
107
 
Both Florida and Tennessee enacted laws denying those convicted of 
infamous crimes from voting.
108
  Currently, no person convicted of any 
infamous crime in Florida is allowed to vote until the governor restores his 
civil rights.
109
  This greatly contrasts with Tennessee, where those 
convicted of the infamous crimes of murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud 
are permanently disenfranchised.
110
  Unlike Pennsylvania, where felons 
must merely finish their prison sentence, both Florida and Tennessee place 
their felons into categories that determine when voting rights can be 
                                                          
 101.  See Mixon, 759 A.2d at 445, 451-52 (denying Pennsylvania’s rational basis 
test because there is no valid reason a felon is better equipped to vote five years after 
completing his sentence). 
 102.  See id. at 451 (rationalizing that it “could not disenfranchise similarly situated 
blue eyed-felons but not brown-eyed felons”). 
 103.  See Barnes, 711 F.2d at 27 (recognizing times when voting rights should be 
withheld, including during incarceration). 
 104.  Compare PA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (stressing the importance of suffrage), with 
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (placing limitations that exclude a person voting in Florida), 
and TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (restricting those who commit certain crimes from voting). 
 105.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (comparing the amount of felons 
disenfranchised in Florida to other states).   
 106.  See id. at 15 (revealing that only Florida and Virginia have more 
disenfranchised felons than Tennessee). 
 107.  See id. at 13, 15 (noting that during the period of 1990-2015 both states have 
only voting rights to 283,563 out of nearly two million disenfranchised felons). 
 108.  Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (excluding those who committed infamous 
crimes, e.g. any felony, from voting), with TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (defining infamous 
crimes as murder, rape, treason, or voter fraud). 
 109.  See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (explaining that the governor has no set guidelines 
when determining who to restore voting rights to, excluding those convicted of 
infamous crimes). 
 110.  See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (expressing the limited crimes that are considered 
infamous). 
15
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restored, if ever.
111
  Permanently disenfranchising a felon who committed 
murder or rape is far less of an injustice than permanently disenfranchising 
a felon who committed an astronomically less morally offensive crime, 
such as a non-violent drug felony.
112
 
While Tennessee denies a felon the right to vote because he has 
committed a horrendous crime like rape or murder, Florida denies felons 
who commit crimes, such as a non-violent drug offense or bribery, from 
voting almost permanently.
113
  This partially accounts for the high amount 
of disenfranchised felons in Florida.
114
  The Florida courts have 
consistently chosen to ignore the astronomical amount of disenfranchised 
felons despite having a clear record that these types of laws are racially 
discriminative.
115
  Florida courts have reasoned that the denial of voting 
rights following a felony conviction is a longstanding and quite common 
practice.
116
  While this reasoning is true, even Pennsylvania recognizes that 
placing insurmountable barriers that result in a complete and permanent 
denial of a voter’s rights does not create a better society.
117
 
In order to maintain their 1.5 million disenfranchised voters in Florida, a 
waiting period of five to seven years is often required after the completion 
                                                          
 111.  Compare 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (excluding 
only those persons currently incarcerated from voting), with FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 
(excluding those convicted of infamous crimes, e.g. any felony, from voting), and 
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (defining infamous crimes as murder, rape, treason, or voter 
fraud). 
 112.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (noting Florida’s restrictive voting laws 
as part of the reason that Florida’s disenfranchises 1.5 million voters). Compare FLA. 
CONST. art. VI, § 4 (excluding any felon from voting), with TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 
(defining those who commit only the most egregious crimes).  
 113.  Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (requiring that all those who commit felonies 
are subject to permanent disenfranchisement), with TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (limiting 
infamous crimes to only the most egregious crimes, such as rape or murder). 
 114.  See Voting Rights Restoration in Florida, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 6, 
2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-florida 
(dictating that the clock resets if an individual is arrested for even a misdemeanor 
during the waiting period, even if no charges are filed).  
 115.  See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(allowing laws because the legislative history did not show intent to discriminate 
despite the effects of the law). 
 116.  See Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969) 
(highlighting that while the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment were being 
adopted, felon disenfranchisement laws persisted uniformly). 
 117.  See Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451, 445 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) 
(finding that there is no rational basis for denying previously unregistered felons the 
right to register for five years when previously registered felons are not subjected to an 
equal waiting period).  
16
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of incarceration, probation, and parole before a felon can even begin the 
process of restoring his voting rights.
118
  However, even if a felon waits the 
required minimum five years, a governor, with the help of his Clemency 
Board, may decide to give him back the right to vote discretionally.
119
  This 
discretion, in addition to the mandatory waiting period, prevents most 
felons in Florida from ever gaining their right to vote back.
120
 
Although Tennessee does not have a mandatory waiting period, 
Tennessee requires felons not convicted of the infamous crimes of rape, 
murder, treason, or voter fraud to apply for a court order to restore voting 
rights.
121
  While Tennessee’s felon disenfranchisement laws seem to 
require a simple process for an ex-felon to follow, its application is far 
more complicated.
122
  Like in Florida, a court in Tennessee retains the right 
to restore an ex-felon’s voting rights discretionally.
123
  Unlike in 
Pennsylvania, a series of complex exceptions make it difficult for convicted 
felons in both Tennessee and Florida to ascertain when a felon might regain 
his right to vote.
124
  Specifically, the felon disenfranchisement laws in 
Tennessee require that those convicted before 1986 petition to the court 
while prosecutors are given an opportunity to object; those convicted after 
1996 are subject to the same rules but those convicted of infamous crimes 
are permanently disenfranchised; and those convicted between 1986 and 
                                                          
 118.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3-4 (highlighting that Florida 
disenfranchises nearly 1.5 million individuals who are in prison, on probation, or on 
parole). Compare Mixon, 759 A.2d at 445-46 (considering whether waiting periods 
violate the Pennsylvania constitution), with Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38, 
2014 WL 3053171, at *5-10 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (choosing not to acknowledge the 
five to seven year waiting period in place in Florida as unconstitutional).  
 119.  See Beacham, 300 F. Supp. at 184 (allowing a governor, with the approval of 
three members of the Cabinet, to use discretion when restoring voting rights). 
 120.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (emphasizing the obstacles Floridian 
felons face when trying to regain voting rights).   
 121.  Compare TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (disenfranchising those who commit 
infamous crimes in Tennessee), with Verity, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 (allowing a five 
to seven year waiting period in Florida).  
 122.  See Voting Tennessee, supra note 33 (discussing Tennessee’s complex voting 
laws). 
 123.  See O’Neal v. Goins, No. M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at 
*1, *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2016) (requiring the court to discretionally provide a 
felon with a certificate of restoration before a restoration of rights is possible). 
 124.  Compare 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (regulating 
only incarcerated felons, with no requirements of waiting periods or applications to a 
court or Governor), with FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (preventing persons convicted of 
felonies from voting until their civil rights have been restored), and TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 40-29-202(b) (2013) (requiring felons to pay all debts). 
17
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1996 may petition for administrative restoration of rights.
125
  Tennessee’s 
requirements easily confuse felons in that state, potentially accounting for 
why so few felons have regained their right to vote.
126
 
Additionally, Tennessee’s laws require that an ex-felon pay his court-
ordered restitution and child support obligations before becoming eligible 
for voting rights, which also greatly hinders a felon’s ability to quickly 
restore his voting rights.
127
  If a felon fails to comply, the court can deny a 
certificate of restoration.
128
  However, eligibility is not freely given, even if 
a felon meets these requirements.
129
  A state election coordinator will look 
at the eligibility of a felon and communicate to the administrator of 
elections whether or not a felon is truly eligible to gain back his voting 
rights; this act, too, is done discretionally.
130
 
While Pennsylvania courts have recognized that restricting an 
incarcerated felon’s rights is within their constitutional power, 
Pennsylvania has chosen not to implement laws that confuse and hinder 
any felons right to vote after being released from prison.
131
  Alternatively, 
both Florida and Tennessee have multiple requirements that both confuse 
and hinder the process.
132
  Court ordered restoration and Governor 
approved restoration results in only a small amount of felons restoring their 
rights after a period of nearly twenty years.
133
  These court orders and 
                                                          
 125.  See Voting Tennessee, supra note 33 (discussing Tennessee’s irrational and 
confusing felon voting laws). 
 126.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13, 15 (showing that of the 421,227 felons 
disenfranchised in Tennessee, this requirement of court ordered restoration only 
restored voting rights to approximately 11,500 felons in a twenty-five-year period).   
 127.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202(b)-(c) (2013).  
 128.  See O’Neal, 2016 WL 4083466, at *5-6 (listing eligibility requirements such 
as receiving a pardon, discharge from custody after serving the maximum sentence, or 
being granted a certificate of final discharge from supervision of the board of parole). 
 129.  See id. at *1, *6 (recognizing that, even if a felon meets the requirements of 
eligibility, the state election coordinator still holds discretion in restoring voting rights).  
 130.   See id. at *6 (explaining that the state election coordinator may formulate a 
uniform procedure for verifying registration eligibility of felon).  
 131.  See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (denying laws with no 
rational basis that restrict voting rights); see also, UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 
(highlighting that Pennsylvania disenfranchises felons only during the incarceration 
period). 
 132.  See Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *3-*4 
(M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (explaining that, because clemency in Florida is controlled by 
the governor, the Clemency board rules may change with each new administration); 
Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 745 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that the ability to pay 
off debts is a prerequisite to voting right restoration in Tennessee).  
 133.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13, 15 (estimating that during a 15-year 
period Florida and Tennessee have restored voting rights to only 283,583 ex-felons 
18
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governor approval restoration methods both allow a figure to discretionally 
and unfairly apply voting rights to some felons while denying others.
134
 
If Florida and Tennessee were to follow Pennsylvania’s approach to 
disenfranchisement statutes, they would drastically increase the number of 
eligible voters in their states, restoring rights of people who have served 
their time.
135
  When nearly two million people are disenfranchised from 
voting based on non-violent convictions, the governments of these states 
are effectively hindering a person’s fundamental right to vote entirely.
136
 
It is clear why the courts have allowed felon disenfranchisement laws 
generally.
137
  It is also clear why in some states like Tennessee, those who 
commit the most egregious crimes will be permanently disenfranchised.
138
  
However, the United States Supreme Court has established that voting is 
one of the most basic rights given to us through the United States 
Constitution.
139
  In Pennsylvania, unlike Tennessee and Florida, the courts 
have recognized that the state has no interest in crafting waiting periods or 
complicated procedures for restoration of voting rights.
140
  Neither Florida 
nor Tennessee has provided a clear reason for refusing to restore voting 
                                                          
while more than two million individuals remain disenfranchised).   
 134.  See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (refusing to allow any felon to vote unless he 
has had his civil rights restored); FLA. STAT. § 940.01(1) (2003) (permitting the 
governor, along with two members of the cabinet, to discretionarily restore civil 
rights); see also TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (denying voting rights to ex-felons without 
discretionary court-ordered approval). 
 135.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (demonstrating that Pennsylvania has 
substantially less disenfranchised felons than Florida and Tennessee).   
 136.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (holding that the right to vote 
is fundamental); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(stating that policy decisions are up to the state government, not federal courts).  
 137.  See Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (explaining 
that incarcerated felons have the right to mail, the right to unlimited access to the 
courts, and the right to purchase and receive law books, but not the right to vote); 
Governor of Fla., 405 F3d at 1234-35 (finding that states have authority to set public 
policy). 
 138.  See TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (defining infamous crimes as murder, rape, 
treason, or voter fraud). 
 139.  See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (declaring the right of suffrage to be a 
fundamental right in a democratic society). 
 140.  Compare Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2000) (rejecting post-sentence the waiting period), with Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-
609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *8-9 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (upholding a waiting 
period of five to seven years in Florida), and Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753 
(6th Cir. 2010) (requiring payment of debts in addition to other requirements before 
being allowed to restore voting rights).  
19
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rights to an ex-felon after he has completed his sentencing.
141
  If Tennessee 
and Florida truly want to uphold the right of suffrage as one of the United 
States’ most basic and fundamental rights, they should adopt the more 




B. The Restriction of Felons’ Voting Rights in Florida and Tennessee 
Should Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth 
Amendment 
Currently, felons in states which require the completion of prison, parole, 
probation, and a post-sentence waiting period have no reasonable, 
achievable means to restore their right to vote.
143
  While these states claim 
the right will be returned after applying to a clemency board or court, the 
current number of felons disenfranchised in these states demonstrates how 
these insurmountable requirements lead to a marginal amount of 
restorations.
144
  Moreover, these felons have no guarantee that their rights 
will ever be restored because the courts have consistently allowed this right 
to be given back discretionally.
145
 
Despite having the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 as outlets to pursue, both of which were created to better provide men 
and women the right to vote, courts have consistently chosen to dismiss 
challenges to felon disenfranchisement statutes.
146
  The Fourteenth 
                                                          
 141.  Compare Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 745 (explaining that a state is within its rights 
to require debt payment), with Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d at 1218 (relying on historical 
tradition to justify disenfranchising felons).  
 142.  Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (requiring felons with even non-violent 
convictions to apply to the Governor for restoration of voting rights), and TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-29-202(b) (2013) (requiring felons to pay all debts prior to restoring their 
right to vote), with 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) 
(disenfranchising incarcerated felons and not creating barriers, such as waiting periods 
or application requirements, against individuals who have completed their sentences).  
 143.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (stating that individuals who are in the 
twelve states that disenfranchise people post-sentence and who have completed their 
sentences constitute more than fifty percent of the entire disenfranchised population, 
totaling almost 3.1 million people).   
 144.  See id. at 13, 15 (demonstrating that, of those currently disenfranchised, 
twenty-three percent are incarcerated while seventy-seven percent have finished their 
sentences and are living in their communities, or are under supervision through 
probation or parole). 
 145.  See O’Neal v. Goins, No. M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at 
*1, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 2016) (allowing a court to restore voting rights 
discretionally); see also Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969) 
(allowing a governor to restore voting rights discretionally).   
 146.  See, e.g., Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d at 1228-29 (denying both claims under 
20
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Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 seem like the most obvious 
ways to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws, perhaps accounting for 




However, both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 are essentially inaccessible for felon disenfranchisement claims.
148
  
Even when presented with overwhelming evidence that felons are being 
discriminatorily disenfranchised, the courts continue to dismiss challenges 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
because these laws were not crafted with the intent of discriminating 
against minorities.
149
  Additionally, the prevalence of felon 
disenfranchisement statutes throughout America’s history have allowed 
courts to seemingly ignore the 6.1 million people in the United States who 
have a small probability of ever regaining their right to vote back despite 




While both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 are effectively prevented from providing any relief to felons wishing 
to restore their voting rights, the Eighth Amendment should provide felons 
with the tools to overrule these oppressive, unbeatable laws currently 
existing in twelve states.
151
  For the most part, the courts have largely 
                                                          
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because these 
protections exist to halt discrimination, rather than undo policies that have been 
accepted and permitted throughout history, e.g., felon disenfranchisement). 
 147.  See id. (challenging felon disenfranchisement laws on both Fourteenth 
Amendment and Voting Rights Act of 1965 grounds). 
 148.  Compare Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-56 (1974) (upholding a 
felon disenfranchisement law under the Fourteenth Amendment, unless discrimination 
is found), with Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (upholding felon 
disenfranchisement laws under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, unless discrimination is 
proven). 
 149.  See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 (explaining that if voting qualifications deny 
citizens the right to vote and were crafted with the intent to discriminate against a race, 
those qualifications would be held unconstitutional); see also UGGEN ET AL., supra note 
8, at 3 (stating that Florida and Tennessee each separately disenfranchise twenty-one 
percent of its African-Americans with more than one in five African-Americans in 
these states disenfranchised). 
 150.  See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 48-49 (referring to the fact that after the Civil 
War, the Union approved southern states’ Constitutions—many of which contained 
felon disenfranchisement statutes); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60 
(1964) (explaining that voting is fundamental right). 
 151.  Compare Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53 (allowing disenfranchisement because 
factors such as age and residence are considered), and Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 
102, 129 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing that statutes must not alter the balance of power 
21
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ignored and dismissed Eighth Amendment claims challenging felon 
disenfranchisement laws without much thought.
152
  The courts that have 
discussed Eighth Amendment claims, simply dismiss them because they 
assert that felon disenfranchisement statutes should be analyzed under the 
Amendment or Act that deal substantively with voting rights.
153
 
However, the courts only choose to truly analyze these statutes under the 
Fourteenth Amendment or Voting Rights Act of 1965 when a statute has 
been created with the intent to discriminate, leaving no viable outlet for 
felons.
154
  Nonetheless, it has been held that because only a few states 
require an application to a court or clemency board to restore voting rights, 
these laws cannot be considered cruel and unusual.
155
  This argument is a 
feeble one when it is nearly impossible to restore voting rights because 
these states often allow these rights to be approved or denied 
discretionally.
156
  If these few states only accounted for a small amount of 
people with repressed rights, then the argument for felon 
disenfranchisement laws might seem less compelling.
157
  However, when 
6.1 million felons are disenfranchised nationwide, and the state of Florida 
alone accounts for more than a quarter of the disenfranchised population 
nationally, it is not merely a small percentage of people disenfranchised.
158
 
                                                          
between the states and the federal government), with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958) (proscribing a modern interpretation of the Eighth Amendment which considers 
society’s current understanding of cruel and unusual).  
 152.  See Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(dismissing cruel and unusual punishment challenges immediately because these 
functions are a non-penal exercise of the power to regulate, and tradition permits it).  
 153.  See Thiess v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 387 F. Supp. 1038, 1039-40, 
1042-43 (D. Md. 1974) (finding that only the Fourteenth Amendment should apply to 
felon disenfranchisement laws). 
 154.  See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 220 (holding that disenfranchisement statutes that 
deny citizens the right to vote because of their race are unconstitutional). 
 155.  See El-Amin v. McDonnell, No. 3:12-cv-00538-JAG, 2013 WL 1193357, at 
*6-7 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2013) (explaining that the widespread enactment of felon 
disenfranchisement laws proves that even the strictest laws are not cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
 156.  Compare Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969) 
(allowing a governor to restore voting rights discretionally), with O’Neal v. Goins, No. 
M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at *1, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 
2016) (dismissing a complaint stating that discretional approval by the court for 
restoration of voting rights was unconstitutional).   
 157.  See Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (allowing a 
disenfranchisement provision because it only disenfranchised a small portion of felons 
and granted voting rights to non-incarcerated felons in general). 
 158.  See UGGEN ET AL. supra note 8, at 3 (highlighting that Florida’s nearly 1.5 
million disenfranchised post-sentence citizens account for nearly half of the national 
22
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Although courts have essentially ignored the Eighth Amendment felon 
disenfranchisement claim because they do not consider it punishment per 
se, the nature of disenfranchisement is fundamentally punitive, and 
accordingly, falls within the confines of cruel and unusual punishment.
159
  
Each of the cases that have extended the Eighth Amendment’s definition of 
cruel and unusual punishment provide one of several arguments as to why 
felon disenfranchisement laws constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
160
 
For example, the Court in Weems found that a punishment must be 
proportional to the offense.
161
  The Court recognized in Weems that even 
after Weems finished his sentence he would forever be kept under the 
shadow of his crime and would likely never retrieve his fall from 
rectitude.
162
  This perpetual limitation of his liberty was not proportional to 
his crime.
163
  When considering the twelve states that nearly permanently 
disenfranchise felons, it is questionable to definitively argue that this 
essentially permanent punishment is proportional to the committed 
offense.
164
  Each of these 6.1 million felons is kept within the shadow of his 
or her crimes, unable to move forward.
165
 
In Tennessee and Florida alone, many felons are excluded from the 
franchise discretionally.
166
  The law does not consider whether the felon 
                                                          
total). 
 159.  See Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (considering 
felon disenfranchisement laws acceptable because the states were given the power to 
regulate elections).  
 160.  See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (proscribing 
punishments that criminalize addiction as cruel and unusual); see also Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (advocating for a modern interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910) (calling for 
punishments to be proportional to the crime).  
 161.  See Weems, 217 U.S. at 381 (explaining that for Weems, a sentence of fifteen 
years was not proportional to his crime of falsifying an official public document). 
 162.  See id. at 366 (arguing that even when a felon is released from prison he would 
still be “subject to tormenting regulations that . . . deprive [citizens] of essential 
liberty.”). 
 163.  See id. at 367 (stating it is necessary that the punishment be graduated and 
proportional to the offense).  
 164.  See Felony Disenfranchisement, supra note 10, at 1 (explaining that the 
restoration process is so cumbersome that few people take advantage of it).  
 165.  Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 366 (explaining after a felon leaves prison he 
may not be imprisoned with iron bars and stone walls but he will still be oppressed due 
to the deprivation of liberty that follows), with UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 
(highlighting that 6.1 million people in the United States are currently unable to regain 
voting rights). 
 166.  Compare Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969) 
(allowing a governor to restore voting rights discretionally), with O’Neal v. Goins, No. 
23
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committed a non-violent drug felony or is simply unable to pay his debts 
because he has struggled to obtain and maintain employment.
167
  Weems v. 
United States recognizes that cruel and unusual does not just apply 
exclusively to punishments that inflict torture or incarceration but also 
those which, by their excessive length or severity, are greatly 
disproportionate to the offenses charged.
168
 
It is generally understood that when a prisoner pays his debt to society, 
he will emerge from prison rehabilitated.
169
  When a felon leaves prison, 
the purpose of his punishment is fulfilled and the crime is repressed by 
penalties of just, not tormenting severity.
170
  This discourages the felon 
from repeating prior crimes.
171
  By denying felons their basic rights, it is 
clear that these states have no interest in restoring voting rights, but rather 
intend to further punish them outside the scope of their original 
punishment.
172
  Instead, these states choose to enact punishments that carry 
on long after the crime and sentencing is completed, clearly permitting 
disproportionate punishments in violation of Weems v. United States.
173
 
While crimes like murder or rape seem to justify a complete denial of 
voting rights, crimes like possession of controlled substances or other drug 
related felonies are small in comparison and disproportionate to the 
                                                          
M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4083466, at *1, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 
2016) (permitting discretional approval by the court for restoration of rights).   
 167.  Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (withholding voting rights to all felons), 
with Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring a felon to pay 
roughly $40,000 in order to begin the process of restoration of his civil rights).  
 168.  See Weems, 217 U.S. at 369-71 (discussing the evolution of the Eighth 
Amendment in the courts and how its protections do not simply cover punishments that 
inflict pain or physical harm).  
 169.  Compare Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967) 
(allowing the restriction of a felon’s civil rights during sentencing), with Mixon v. 
Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding that once 
released from prison, there is no reason to continue depriving voting rights). 
 170.  See Weems, 217 U.S. at 381 (explaining that the state operates best, suffers 
nothing, and loses no power when it releases a felon after the completion of a 
sentence). 
 171.  See id. (explaining that hope is given for the reformation of the criminal when 
a felon is released).  
 172.  Compare Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *5 
(M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (explaining that the previous governor of Florida loosened 
restrictions on restoration of voting rights for felons, but the current governor reinstated 
the more restrictive waiting period), with Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 745 (noting that, while 
payment of debts has not always been a requirement, the state may institute this more 
restrictive change).  
 173.  See Weems, 217 U.S. at 366 (stating that it is precept of justice when 
punishment for a crime is proportionate to the offense).  
24
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punishment of disenfranchisement.
174
  Furthermore, in states like 
Tennessee and Florida, the states claim that the right to vote may easily be 
given back, but in practice these requirements are insurmountable, 
requiring significant time, money, and status to be one of the special 
individuals granted restoration.
175
  The majority of these felons whose 
rights are essentially permanently taken away are adults who live, work, 




Because only twelve out of fifty states implement this kind of restriction 
on ex-felons, it is clear that this deprivation of rights is not widespread 
throughout the United States.
177
  If a majority of the states incurred this 
restriction, then the argument that deprivation of felon voting rights 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment would be moot.
178
  Rather, 
several states have chosen to lessen their felon voting restrictions 
substantially, recognizing the unfairness in felony voting laws and making 




If the United States Supreme Court chooses to ignore that the 
punishment of nearly permanent disenfranchisement is not proportional to 
the majority of crimes committed by felons, the argument that the Eighth 
Amendment is held to evolving standards still demonstrates that restrictive 
                                                          
 174.  See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (placing limitations on any felon, regardless of the 
crime convicted, from voting); see also TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (precluding those who 
commit the most egregious of crimes from voting permanently).   
 175.  Compare Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969) 
(permitting the governor to restore voting discretionarily), with O’Neal v. Goins, No. 
M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, at *1, *8 (allowing discretional approval by the court for 
restoration of voting rights), and UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (naming both Florida 
and Tennessee among the six states that disenfranchise more than seven percent of the 
adult population in their state). 
 176.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 14 (explaining that, if the laws were 
changed to require a felon to have his rights restored for people on probation or parole, 
seventy-seven percent of the 6.1 million people currently disenfranchised would regain 
the right to vote). 
 177.  See id. at 3-4 (highlighting that the near total deprivation of voting rights most 
frequently occurs in the states whose laws continue to disenfranchise individuals after 
they complete their prison sentences).  
 178.  Cf. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1220 (11th Cir. 2005) (relying 
on tradition to demonstrate that felon disenfranchisement was always considered 
constitutional). 
 179.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (demonstrating that in 2013, Delaware 
removed the five-year waiting period and in 2016 Maryland eliminated the ban on 
voting for persons on probation or under parole supervision).  
25
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felon disenfranchisement laws constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
180
  
Both Weems v. United States and Trop v. Dulles provide an argument for 
why certain felon disenfranchisement laws should fall under a modern 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
clause.
181
  In Trop v. Dulles, the Court announced that the Eighth 
Amendment should draw its meaning from the “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
182
  Similarly, in 
Weems, the Court explained that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
could be progressive and change as public opinion becomes enlightened by 
a humane justice.
183
  The Court’s adoption of a modern interpretation of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause procures that if society understands 
the deprivation of voting rights as unjust punishment, then felon 
disenfranchisement statutes would be unconstitutional.
184
 
As more states depart from post-sentencing restrictions and court or 
clemency board approval, states that impose the harshest restrictions are 
receiving increased scrutiny and disapproval.
185
  The duties of citizenship 
are numerous, many of these obligations being essential to the security and 
well-being of the nation.
186
  Depriving someone of her right to vote 




                                                          
 180.  Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (stating that the 
Eighth Amendment “may therefore be progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, 
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice”), 
with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (reasoning that the words of the 
Eighth Amendment are not precise, and their scope is not static).   
 181.  Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (arguing for a modern interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment), with Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-3 (explaining that a modern 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is necessary). 
 182.  Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03 (adopting a modern interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment because expatriation for the crime of desertion went far beyond the normal 
punishment).  
 183.  See Weems, 217 U.S. at 373 (stating that “a principle, to be vital, must be 
capable of wider application than the mischief to which it give it birth.”). 
 184.  See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03 (expressing that a modern interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment might better serve today’s society); see also UGGEN ET AL., supra 
note 8, at 3 (highlighting that there are currently six million disenfranchised felons in 
the United States). 
 185.  See Felony Disenfranchisement, supra note 10, at 2-3 (listing recent policy 
changes in eighteen states). 
 186.  See Trop, 356 U.S. at 92 (reasoning that citizenship cannot be revoked every 
time a duty of citizenship is shirked).   
 187.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-560 (1964) (stating that the right to 
vote is fundamental); Trop, 356 U.S. at 92 (permitting Trop to keep his citizenship); 
Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 
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Although cruel and unusual punishment typically only applies to the 
most egregious of punishments, the United States Supreme Court extends it 
when faced with an injustice.
188
  In Robinson v. California, the Court 
recognized that depriving someone of a liberty for something menial is 
unjust.
189
  Alternatively, while expatriation was not something generally 
deemed as cruel and unusual, the Court reasoned that deprivation of 
citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to express its 




Felon disenfranchisement laws requiring waiting periods and Governor 
approval could also be seen as a penal law because they disenfranchise so 
many people.
191
  Trop sets forth the idea that the basic concept underlying 
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.
192
  It is less 
than the dignity of man to require someone to pay nearly fifty-thousand 
dollars to restore his right to vote after completing his prison sentence.
193
  
Similarly, requiring an individual to wait five to seven years after 
completion of his sentence to apply for restoration appears to be an attempt 
to further punish felons outside the boundaries of the original sentence.
194
  
This waiting period bares striking similarity to the concept articulated in 
Weems v. United States that even after men and women are released from 
prison they have a shadow over them that deprives them of their liberty at 
                                                          
2014) (allowing waiting periods before restoration of voting rights). 
 188.  See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661-62 (1962) (holding that 
criminalization of addiction is cruel and unusual punishment); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 
(considering expatriation cruel and unusual punishment); Weems, 217 U.S. at 362 
(finding excessive imprisonment for falsification of a document cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
 189.  See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (explaining that “even one day in prison would 
be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”). 
 190.  See Trop, 356 U.S. at 92-93 (reasoning that citizenship cannot be revoked 
every time a duty of citizenship is shirked). 
 191.  Compare UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (highlighting that felons in Florida 
and Tennessee account for nearly two million of the six million disenfranchised 
felons), with Trop, 356 U.S. at 97 (stating that the denial of rights was a penal 
punishment because the punishment was disproportionate to the crime). 
 192.  See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03 (recognizing that the Eighth Amendment stands 
to assure that its power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards). 
 193.   Cf. Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 753 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring a felon 
to pay $40,000 restitution for wire fraud and more than $1,000 in child support in order 
to regain his right to vote was constitutional).  
 194.  Compare Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2000) (rejecting waiting periods in Pennsylvania), with Verity v. Scott, No. 2:12-cv-
609-FtM-38, 2014 WL 3053171, at *8 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2014) (permitting waiting 
periods that were recently implemented by the current governor of Florida).  
27
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In Florida, felons are faced with the reality that they must wait several 
years just to begin the process of applying for restoration of voting 
rights.
196
  This waiting period is clearly not proportional to the crime.
197
  
Pennsylvania found that there was no just reason to require a felon to wait 
this extended amount of time because it was beneath the dignity of man.
198
  
Pennsylvania recognizes that in many cases disenfranchisement is not 
proportional to the crime.
199
  Felons released from prison should be entitled 
to the fundamental right to vote.
200
 
Since the courts have established that the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 effectively preclude all felon 
disenfranchisement challenges, it is up to the courts to recognize that the 
Eighth Amendment provides an opportunity to fix the wrongs implemented 
by twelve states.
201
  The courts must open the door to felon 
disenfranchisement succeeding under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 




                                                          
 195.  See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (arguing that 
punishments can be ongoing long after the period of incarceration ends).  
 196.  Compare id. at 366 (explaining that after prison a person is often kept within 
voice and view of a magistrate), with Verity, 2014 WL 3053171, at *5 (allowing for a 
waiting period that was implemented by the current governor of Florida). 
 197.  Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 366-68 (considering hard labor for falsifying 
documents cruel and unusual punishment), with Verity, 2014 WL 3053171, at *1 
(permitting a waiting period that continues for nearly a decade). 
 198.  See Mixon, 759 A.2d at 445 (recognizing there was no legitimate reason to say 
a felon was in a better position to vote because he had been out of prison for five 
years).  
 199.  Compare Weems, 217 U.S. at 366 (introducing punishment being 
proportionate with crime), with Mixon, 759 A.2d at 445 (recognizing that the 
punishment was not proportionate to the crime). 
 200.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1964) (explaining that the right 
of suffrage is a fundamental right). 
 201.  Compare Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (denying felon 
disenfranchisement challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment), and Farrakhan v. 
Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying felon disenfranchisement 
challenges under the Voting Rights Act of 1965), with Weems, 217 U.S. at 362 
(requiring punishment be proportional to the crime and opening up the Eighth 
Amendment to modern interpretation). 
 202.  See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (adopting a modern interpretation 
of the Eighth Amendment leaves many arguments available as society continues to 
progress).  
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IV.  POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
One of the staples of American democracy is the right to vote in 
elections.
203
  While the United States has not always provided each 
individual in America with the right to vote, as society progresses we have 
seen voting rights expanded to those who have been oppressed.
204
  After the 
Civil War, voting rights were given to African-American slaves, despite the 
Founding Fathers’ intent to disenfranchise slaves.
205
  After the woman’s 
suffrage movement, voting rights were given to women even though when 
“all men are created equal” was written in the Constitution it was intended 
to only refer to white men.
206
  When African-American’s rights were still 
being denied, a Voting Rights Act was created to ensure that every person 
had the opportunity to vote in America.
207
 
Currently, 6.1 million people are forbidden from voting in the United 
States because they have committed felonies.
208
  The percent of felons 
disenfranchised is even higher among minorities, specifically within the 
African-American population.
209
  Twelve states and legislatures claim it is 
better to have ex-felons apply to have their civil rights restored only well 
after they have been released from prison.
210
  However, research has shown 
                                                          
 203.  See Presidential Elections, HIST. CHANNEL, http://www.history.com/topics/us-
presidents/presidential-elections (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (explaining that the United 
States left the British monarchical tradition and created a system where people could 
vote and select their leaders). 
 204.  See U.S. Voting Rights Timeline, N. CAL. CITIZENSHIP PROJECT, 1-5 
http://www.kqed.org/assets/pdf/education/digitalmedia/us-voting-rights-timeline.pdf 
(highlighting how voting rights have been expanded since 1776 to include African-
Americans and women).  
 205.  See The Civil War: The Senate’s Story, UNITED STATES SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilWarAmendments.ht
m (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (explaining the admission of the Civil War Amendments).  
 206.  See id. (highlighting that it took 100 years for women voting rights to be 
implemented). 
 207.  See Jamelle Bouie, The Voting Rights Act: A 20th Century American 
Recolution, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Aug. 6, 2012) http://prospect.org/article/voting-
rights-act-20th-century-american-revolution (explaining that previously, the ability for 
African-Americans to vote was virtually nonexistent).  
 208.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (highlighting that 2.5 percent of the total 
U.S. voting age population — one of every forty adults — is disenfranchised due to a 
felony conviction).  
 209.  See Editorial, Florida Should Restore Ex-Felon Voting Rights, SUN SENTINEL 
(August 31, 2016), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/editorials/fl-editorial-felons-
voting-20160829-story.html (noting that in Florida alone felon disenfranchisement 
laws disqualify nearly one in four African-American residents from casting ballots).  
 210.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 13 (showing that even though states claim 
these restrictive rules are better, these states generally do not provide restoration to 
29
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that felons in states who are given back their right to vote after being 




Additionally, efforts to change felon disenfranchisement laws have come 
to the forefront of conversations during election years.
212
  In the summer of 
2016, the Governor of Virginia executed a blanket restoration of voting 
rights for felons who had completed their sentences that was quickly 
overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court.
213
  As more states move away 
from post-sentencing restrictions and court or clemency board approval, 




Felons like Perry Hopkins and Desmond Meade have paid back their 
debts to society, yet they are precluded from one of the most sacred rights 
in our society.
215
  At this point, it is not necessary to claim that all felon 
disenfranchisement laws should be unconstitutional.
216
  Depriving someone 
of the right to vote because of transgressions committed against society 
should be allowed as tradition at the time of the Ratification demonstrates 
that our Founder Fathers accepted it.
217
  However, our Founding Fathers 
also allowed many other things that are now repugnant.  Felon 
disenfranchisement laws in states that prevent more than seven percent of 
adults the right to vote after they have paid back their debts to society 
should also be considered repugnant.
218
 
                                                          
felons).   
 211.  See James Call, Study Shows Ex-Cons Benefit from Rights Restoration, WFSU, 
http://news.wfsu.org/post/study-shows-ex-cons-benefit-rights-restoration (explaining 
that in Florida, ex-felons, whose rights to vote was automatically restored, were less 
likely to commit new crimes).  
 212.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 3. 
 213.  See id. at 4 (highlighting that since the Virginia Supreme Court overturned the 
blanket restoration, the Governor of Virginia has individually approved voting rights 
for 12,832 individuals). 
 214.  See Felony Disenfranchisement, supra note 10, at 2-3 (listing recent policy 
changes in eighteen states, which allow for felons to regain their voting rights with 
greater ease). 
 215.  Compare Martin, supra note 1 (detailing the struggle Perry Hopkins faced to 
regain his right to vote), with Ollstein, supra note 6 (describing Desmond Meade’s 
personal life and how he is still being denied the right to vote in Florida). 
 216.  See Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (arguing that 
a felon cannot vote while incarcerated because it is only when fundamental, humane, 
and necessary rights are breached that constitutional protections become involved). 
 217.  See Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(explaining that eleven constitutions adopted between 1776 and 1821 authorized the 
legislatures to prohibit exercise of the franchise by convicted felons).  
 218.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 12 (asserting that 6.1 million felons 
30
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol25/iss3/3
HEATH 3/9/2017(DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2017  6:59 PM 
2017] CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 357 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although felon disenfranchisement laws are common throughout the 
United States and disenfranchise millions of people, the judicial system has 
consistently chosen to permit the states to draft and enforce their own 
unique election laws.
219
  When comparing Pennsylvania, Florida, and 
Tennessee, each state has addressed felon disenfranchisement laws in some 
way.
220
  Pennsylvania acknowledges that it maintains the right to enforce 
felon disenfranchisement but chooses to do so in the least restrictive 
means.
221
  If Florida and Tennessee were to adopt laws similar to 
Pennsylvania they would enfranchise over seven percent of each of their 
populations.
222
  By not restoring felons’ voting rights, states are 




While challenges to these felon disenfranchisement laws generally fail, 
there may be a path to success through the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause.
224
  This clause has only considered three non-
traditional punishments to be cruel and unusual, generally because the 
punishment is not proportional to the crime.
225
  If courts were to look at the 
proportionality of felon disenfranchisement laws and their punishment, it 
                                                          
disenfranchised reside mostly in states with strict felon disenfranchisement laws).  
 219.  See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974) (holding it is not a 
court’s decision to determine values). 
 220.  Compare FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (requiring all felons to apply to the 
Governor for restoration of voting rights), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-29-202(b) 
(2013) (requiring felons to pay all debts prior to restoration), with 25 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2012) (denying only incarcerated felons voting rights). 
 221.  See Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451-53 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) 
(condemning waiting periods because waiting periods have not proven to create better 
voters).  
 222.  See UGGEN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 (noting that Florida and Tennessee 
disenfranchises more than eight percent of its adult population while Pennsylvania only 
disenfranchises 0.52 percent).  
 223.  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1964) (explaining that the right 
of suffrage is a fundamental right). 
 224.  See Felony Disenfranchisement, supra note 10, at 1-3 (discussing the history 
of felon disenfranchisement in the United States and the courts’ consistent failure to 
recognize the unconstitutionality of these laws under the Voting Rights Act and the 
Fourteenth Amendment).   
 225.  Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1910) (holding 
imprisonment for falsification of an official public document to be cruel and unusual 
punishment), with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (finding that expatriation for 
desertion is cruel and unusual punishment), and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 
661-62 (1962) (holding punishment for addiction to be cruel and unusual punishment). 
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would be clear that these laws violate the Eighth Amendment.
226
 
                                                          
 226.  See Weems, 217 U.S. at 385-86 (requiring that punishments must be 
appropriate and proportional to the crime). 
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